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V.—DISCUSSION.
" I L L U S O R Y PSYCHOLOGY."
By Professor JOHN DEWHY.
The fact that so acute and experienced a philosophical thinker
as Mr. Shadworth Hodgson has misapprehended the bearing of
the articles by me in MIND NOS. 41,42, must be my excuse for again
troubling the readers with reference to the matters discussed
there. Mr. Hodgson seems to think that it was the object of one
to explain the nature of the individual and the universal con-
sciousness, and of the other to give some definite directions
regarding the application of method to philosophy and psychology.
Thus apprehending them, he quite naturally complains of the
" blanks " in the argument; and, if I may judge from the tone of
his remarks, thinks, indeed, that there is not so much an argument
as an assumption, while my lack of logic is to him lamentable.
May I be allowed to state that I had no such ends in view, and
that what seems to Mr. Hodgson a lack of logic on my part
seems to me a misunderstanding of logical bearing on his part ?
The logical purpose of the first article was as follows : Granted
the general truth of that way of looking at philosophical questions
which is specifically English (and which, following the usual cus-
tom, I called psychological), (1) to determine whether some im-
portant factor has not been overlooked; (2) to show that it is
involved in this standpoint that all questions must be decided
from their place in conscious experience; (3) to show that this
general statement applies to particular questions, like the nature
of subject and object, universal and individual; and (4) to show
that this in turn implies that the psychological standpoint is one
which transcends and underlies the distinction of subject and
object, &c. Now it was open to Mr. Hodgson, or anyone else, to
reply that I misinterpreted the standpoint of British philosophy ;
or that, while its standpoint was correctly stated, it involved no
such implications as I thought it did ; or that while it did involve
such implications, this fact is, at bottom, only a reduclio ad abmirdum
of the standpoint But objections like those of Mr. Hodgson, with
all due deference, seem to me a huge Lgnoratio denchi.
And his misunderstanding of the logical bearing of the whole
has influenced his treatment of details. Mr. Hodgson's aver-
sion to some expressions is so acute that he seems hardly to have
asked himself in what connexion these phrases are used. If he
will re-read certain pages of the article referred to, I think he
will see that the terms ' postulate' and ' presupposition,' whose
use seems to him to involve a contradiction on my part, are used
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84 J. DBWET :
not generally, nor with reference to my own standpoint, but in
connexion with this examination of British philosophy, and that
the contention of the article is, rather, that what has been an un-
conscious presupposition ought to be given a psychological exami-
nation and position.
So the logical bearing of the second article was not to give
recommendations regarding specific methods, but to suggest to
those whom Mr. Hodgson calls my " Germanising friends " that
their results will neverhave a firm basis until they are reached by
a psychological method. The article was entitled "Psychology as
Philosophic Method," just as Mr. Hodgson might call a portion
of his article " Metaphysic as Philosophic Method ".
I t thus appears to me that the mass of Mr. Hodgson's direct
specific criticism is so beside the mark that it is needless to under-
take a detailed review of it. But one may always learn much from
Mr. Hodgson when he is positively propounding his own views; and
certain discussions, as, e.g., regarding the nature of the universal
and the individual, and the mutual connexions of science, philo-
sophy and psychology, are never beside the mark. I should like
bnefly to discuss the attempts which Mr. Hodgson kindly makes
to fill the " blanks " in my argument.
i.
First, then, as to the relation of the individual and the universal
consciousness, or, more properly speaking, of the individual and the
universal in consciousness. The position of Mr. Hodgson, as I
understand it, is that I have not duly distinguished between
perceptual processes, which give us the individual, and concep-
tual processes, which generalise it and give us a result more or
less abstract, and that consequently I have erected a generalised
notion of my individual consciousness,—a logical abstraction into
an actual ens, which I call universal consciousness (pp. 480 and
484). The real state of the case, we are to believe, is as follows :
There is a " stream of states and changes " which comes to every
individual; this is an individualised stream, and occurs in percep-
tual order. Out of it the world of ordinary experience is budt.
But the individual can think as well as perceive, and he comes
gradually to generalise. This process of generalisation he extends
even to his own consciousness; he generalises conscious experi-
ence itselt But the generalisation does not give, either in know-
ledge or belief, a universal consciousness different in any way
from his own. It is merely the logical or conceptual way of
representing individuality of what in actual experience is per-
ceptual (pp. 480 and 483). A universal self can only be represented
in thought as an individual self indefinitely or infinitely magnified
(p. 486). The result is that, while we may speak of universal
knowledge, the content of consciousness, it is fallacious and self-
contradictory to speak of a universal knower, the agent or bearer
of consciousness (pp. 484 and 485). The gist of the whole
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" HiLUSOBT PSYCHOLOGY." 85
controversy is, that while we may and must assume individuality
•as given to us (pp. 480, 483), universality is the result of a logical
process. As to this I have to say:—
1. Mr Hodgson is misled by an ambiguity in the use of the
term ' individual'. In one sense (in which it cannot be the subject
matter of any science) it is given to us; in another (in the sense
in which it is an object of scientific knowledge) it is not given to
us, but is a product of psychological experience. Every experi-
ence is given to us as a unique experience, a fact of absolute and
immediate interest. Individuality in this sense is indeed an
-assumption which we need nob care to avoid. But this assump-
tion is only the assumption that a fact exists ; it tells us nothing
of the meaning of the fact. And it is the assumption that we
know at the outset, what individuality means, and that the imme-
diate fact of experience is the same as an interpretation of the
fact, which plays such havoc with Mr. Hodgson's ideaa I t is
this assumption which enables him to slide unconsciously from
the immediate unique interest which accompanies every experi-
ence, and which makes it mine or thine, to the fact of individuality,
as one being among others, limited in space and time, and whose
ideas occur as a " stream ". Individuality in t.hiH sense is not
" given/' is not "immediate,1' and is an assumption which we
must avoid making until we see what it means—until, in short, it
is not an assumption. Individuality in this sense may be provi-
sionally opposed to universality, but this sense is not an original
or immediate dictum. It is a product which has come about
through experience, through psychological experience. The pro-
cess of its coming about, the way in which this gets to be a fact
of our conscious experience, is something to be examined by psy-
chology. The psychological standpoint is prior, so to speak, to
this result. I t is confusion enough to substitute this psychologi-
cal product for the immediate individuality which is a matter of
feeling, but to substitute a philosophical interpretation of the fact
is to carry the confusion a step further. And this Mr. Hodgson
does in giving individuality a meaning—that is, an interpretation
—which opposes it absolutely to universality. One thing which
Mr. Hodgson would have learned by going to psychology rather
than to metaphysics would be to avoid this threefold confusion
of the individuality of immediate feeling, of constructed fact of
experience and of philosophical interpretation of the fact
2. The substitution appears, however, in a still worse plight
when we consider that this view of individuality which opposes it
absolutely to universality is an incurred interpretation. I speak,
not as a Germanising transcendentalist, but according to my
humble lights as a psychologist, when I say that I know nothing
of a perceptual order apart from a conceptual, and nothing of an
agent or bearer apart from the content which it bears. As a
psychologist, I see the possibility of abstractly analysing each
from the other, and, if I were as fond of erecting the results of an
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86 J. DEWEY :
analysis Into real entities as Mr. Hodgson believes me to be, I
should suppose that they were actually distinct as concrete exist-
ences. But, sticking fast to what Psychology teaches me, I must
hold that they are aspects, analytically arrived at, of the. one
existing reality—conscious experience. Mr. Hodgson finds no
difficulty in making the separation. He assumes—and speaking
from the metaphysical standpoint would naturally assume—that
•there is " a stream of changes and states'' which "come to an
individual," and " out of this as data is built up ordinary experi-
ence ". So he regards this " stream " as in some way individual,
while the world built up out of it—the content—may be distin-
guished from it. To me it seems that this " stream " is built up
along with, and mostly out of, the experiences of the everyday
•world. Stream and world are equallypsychological constructions,
built up by psychological processes. I t must be from Metaphysic
(it cannot be from Psychology) that Mr. Hodgson gets a " stream"
which is given ready made. Psychology would tell us that the
" stream '' is essentially du9 to projections out from the present
by a psychological mechanism in the form of memory and expec-
tation. Consciousness is not a moving body, which, flying through
time, leaves a trail behind it, as does a rocket in space. When
the idea of an absent person is suggested to an infant, the child
does not conceive this as an idea, but looks about him to localise
the person. His life is a present one, and it is only through a
psychological development that he comes to have experiences
placed as past and anticipated as future. The experiences of
time and of " streams'' are due to psychological dynamics. The
process by which the individual comes to connect certain experi-
ences with himself as a being continuous in time, and to separate
them from others which he refers to existences in space, is one
of the problems of psychology. What is the bearing of all this ?
Simply, that we have no ready-made distinction between -the indU
vidual agent and the world of experience over against him, but
that each is built up out of a common material by contemporaner
ou's processes. A correct psychology would teach Mr. Hodgson,,
it seems to me, not only that the ordo ad individuwn and the ordo
ad' umversvm are built out of a common stock, but that the process-
is a reciprocal one, so that our ideas of ourselves as individuals,
nay ourselves as individuals, are made up out of our experiences
of the world, and vice versd. The agent is not the agent which
it is without the content, not only in the sense that it bears
that content and no other, but in the sense that this content reacts
upon it and is organised into it to make it what it specifically is.
If Mr. Hodgson will make an absolute separation Detween the
individual as agent and the content of consciousness as general,
he will find that all that is left to the agent is : a; is experienced
and is interesting, where it is impossible to give x any definite
values. Its analogies we may hypothetically find in the conscious-
ness of an oyster.
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3^ And finally upon this point, I JCQOW of no perception which,
is not made what it is by conceptual elements within it. Mr.
Hodgson well says that " every act of attention to a percept is the'
commencement of a generalisation " (p. 481). But it cannot be
possible that Mr. Hodgson supposes that perceptions are given to
us .prior to attention, and that this is an activity which super-
venes, the perception once formed. Correct psychology seems to
teach that the attention—the active connexion between the mind
and a given psychical complex—is necessary to interpret, to make it
a percept. And unless there are two utterly different kinds of atten-
tion, generalisation most be thus introduced, and a universal ele*
mant be present in the percept. I cannot believe accordingly
that Mr. Hodgson's attempt to set up individuality of conscious-
ness as opposed to universality is successful, whether it proceeds
by. distinguishing the perceptual order from the conceptual, or by
distinguishing the stream of consciousness as given from the con-
tent of that consciousness as interpreted. At all events, I hope
it is clear that this conception of universality of consciousness is
not that of an individual indefinitely magnified. I should still be
coimpellsd to ask, What is this individual which is magnified ? and
if I deal with facts and not with analytic abstractions, I find it to
be bound up through and through with universal factors, nay con-
stituted by its relation to the universal factor. One word more,
and I have done with this point. The universality of conscious-
ness stands just where its individuality does. An individuality is
" given " in the sense that every consciousness has a unique in-
terest ; so universality is "given" in the sense that every conscious-
ness has a meaning. But the experience of the world as a fact.
like the experience of the individual stream as a fact, is a con-
structed product And the philosophical interpretation of the fact
that there is a world of experience is still more remote from being
immediate or given. In each of these three stages it stands just
where individuality does.
n.
I can treat but briefly of the other point : the relation between
Psychology and what Mr. Hodgson calls Metaphysic and what I
called Logic Mr. Hodgson seems to think that upon my theory
no place can be left for physiological psychology, for race-psycho-
logy, &c., Ac They would, however, be left just where they are
now—as special methods for determining the conditions and
genesis of various factors in conscious experience.
, When Mr. Hodgson says that1 Metapnysic abstracts from the
fact, that consciousness is individually conditioned (pp. 490 and
493) he simply suggests the point which was uppermost in my
mjnd when I wrote the article on " Psychology as Philosophic
Method ". Metaphysic or Logic does abstract from the indivi-
dnal, -which conditions the content. As thus abstract, it cannot
furnish the final method of philosophy, for as abstract it makes an
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88 0. L. MOBGAN :
assumption and is incomplete. I t is incomplete; for is this unique
and yet absolutely universal fact that the content of consciousness
is known only in and to an individual—is this fact to be left out of
account ? The play of " Hamlet" with Hamlet left out seems to
me nothing in comparison. I t makes an assumption, for to make
assumptions is simply to see how facts look when some integral
factor is omitted.
English thought, according to Mr. Hodgson, has commonly
ignored the universal or all-embracing character of the conscious-
ness, and has identified it with individual being. So it seems to
me, and the article in MIND NO. 41 was written to show that
psychology could not be even psychology, much less philosophy,
until the universal factor in consciousness was attended to. Tran-
scendentalism, he says, inclines to identify consciousness with
universal being, and if this be interpreted to mean that it inclines
to neglect the individual agent, without which the universality of
the content is naught, I heartily agree with him. The article in
MIND NO. 42 was written to show that transcendentalism was
incomplete till it recognised that the universal content can be
realised only in an individual bearer. And I make bold to add
that Mr. Hodgson thinks the two sides may be split, one surren-
dered to Psychology, the other reserved for Metaphysic; while to
me it seems that we shall never get the surest footing and the
completest results until we recognise that such halves—the indi-
vidual without the universal content, and the universal content
without the individual bearer—are disjecta membra. The science
which unites them, and considers the content as realised in and
by an individual, and the individual as realised through and by
the content, seems to me to be Psychology. A psychology which
should attempt to occupy the position Mr. Hodgson gives to it
•would have nothing to say except—Here is a consciousness which
interests me, but about which I can say nothing.
THE GENERALISATIONS OF SCIENCE.
By Professor C. LLOYD MOBGAN.
An important question is suggested by Mr. N. Pearson's interest-
ing discussion of 'The Definition of Natural Law' in MIND NO. 44.
That question concerns the relation that Natural Law bears to the
generalisations of science. Are the two fields coextensive ? or is
Natural Law a vast region of which the generalisations of science
constitute only the known and accurately surveyed areas? Mr.
Pearson holds the latter view. He objects to Lewes's description
of a law as a notation of observed facts, and to the current defini-
tions of natural laws as generalisations from experience, on the
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